This is not the first time Azerbaijan has conducted military exercises in the Caspian Sea. However, the character of these exercises suggested that Azerbaijan is seriously worried about the security of its vital infrastructure in the Caspian. Events preceding the April 2012 exercises, such as a deterioration of relations with Iran as well as Baku’s quest to become a transit territory for a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Europe, may be a prelude for such high-scale exercises.

First, the nature of Azerbaijani military exercises suggested that actions are directed against an enemy possessing a helicopter, a ship and even a submarine. It is hard to imagine that certain terrorist group would be able to acquire such arms or equipment, especially when taking into consideration the fact that the Caspian Sea does not have direct access to open waters. Recent information leaks regarding an Azerbaijani-Israeli arms deal worth $1.5 billion revealed that Baku had purchased Israeli made Gabriel-5 anti-ship missiles (News.az, March 29). This raises the question: which Caspian neighbor is Azerbaijan most worried about? So far, Azerbaijan had only one small incident in the Caspian Sea. In 2000, an Iranian naval ship refused to allow an Azerbaijani exploration vessel to begin working on oil fields in the southern Caspian. The Iranian side claimed that Baku was violating Iranian territorial waters. A lack of serious arms and equipment and an unwillingness to escalate the conflict did not allow Azerbaijan to continue exploration of the “disputed” oilfield. Yuriy Bondar, a Russian military expert with the Russian-based Middle East Institute, believes that both US and Israeli assistance to Azerbaijan would likely allow Baku to push back against Tehran and regain control of areas that Iran considers “disputed” (Golos Rossii, April 20).

Also of note are Iranian actions for the last couple of years. Iranian naval forces formed the Third United Military District to oversee the Caspian Sea. The district includes divisions of the Navy, Army and the Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, the Third United Military District is equipped with Sana-type speed-boats, a small submarine armed with torpedoes as well as the Sabehat-15 mini-submarine, used for intelligence gathering and subversive actions (Golos Rossii, April 20).

Baku’s northern neighbor also did not ignore Azerbaijani military exercises. The exercises coincided with news distributed by the Russian media that Russian ships were to be deployed to the Caspian Sea’s operationally important areas. Colonel Igor Gorbul, the head of the press service of the Southern Military District, told Interfax on April 17 that a group of Caspian Flotilla vessels comprising the Astrakhan small artillery ship and support ships was completing preparations for Caspian Sea maneuvers. The exercise’s main aim was a showing of the flag and to display the Russian Federation’s naval prowess ensuring a Russian Naval presence in the Caspian Sea’s operationally important areas (Interfax, April 17). He added that other tasks included the protection of Russian shipping and oil production facilities at sea from potential threats and monitoring the extraction of hydrocarbons and bio resources.

Russian authorities are extremely worried about recent energy developments in the Caspian, which boosted the prospects for a Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan to Turkey and further to Europe. Although Azerbaijan clearly stated that it would serve only as a transit country, Moscow has been trying to put pressure on both Ashgabat and Baku using these types of naval military exercises. On May 5, the Russian Navy’s Caspian forces conducted missiles launches using the recently installed Bal-E system. Anti-ship missiles successfully hit the conditional target located 50 kilometers away from the launch site in the Caspian Sea. A day earlier, “Tatarstan,” the flagship of the Russian Caspian Navy, also implemented missile launches in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s Caspian Flotilla plans to receive the small artillery ships Makhachkala and Volgodonsk as well as the missile ship Dagestan by the end of the year. Overall, 16 new ships will become part of the Russian Navy in the Caspian Sea by 2020 (Komsomolskaya Pravda, May 5).

The recent naval exercises by Azerbaijan and Russia suggest that Caspian littoral states continue to strengthen their military capacities in the area. So far, only Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan have the capacity to protect their claimed Caspian Sea areas. If Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan begin bolstering their own naval and coastal defense capabilities, however, a true militarization of the Caspian Sea could become inevitable.

Without confirming the specific charges, the State Department observed that, “For years, we have seen the Iranian Government use violence to advance its own political agenda, and considering it is the principal state-sponsor of terrorism, it would come as no surprise that it would engage in such efforts” (Office of the State Department Spokesperson, March 16).

A Ministry of National Security statement said that they found “firearms, cartridges, explosives and espionage equipment” when they arrested the suspects. Azerbaijani officials claim that Iranian agents had recruited the suspects starting in 1999. Their purpose was to help Iran’s secret services gather intelligence on foreign embassies, organizations, and companies in Azerbaijan and stage attacks against them. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps supposedly trained them in espionage and combat techniques at military camps in Iran.

Although the arrests occurred in January and February, the government delayed announcing them until after Defense Minister Safar Abiyev returned from a two-day visit to Tehran, where he met President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials. Ahmadinejad assured Abiyev that, “The Islamic Republic of Iran always supports the independence, grandeur, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Fars News Agency, March 13). He also claimed that, “The mutual enemies of the two countries seek to halt the enhancement of ties between Tehran and Baku” (Press TV, March 13). Citing their mutual interests, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi called for expanding Iran-Azerbaijan ties (news.az, March 14).

Despite these generous words, last month the Iranian Foreign Ministry complained to the Azerbaijani ambassador to Tehran about Azerbaijan’s $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/231314.html). Azerbaijani officials have argued that the purchase was not directed against Iran and designed only to strengthen the Azerbaijani military’s capacity against Armenia, whose troops occupy Azerbaijani territory.

During his recent visit, Abiyev again insisted that Azerbaijan would never attack Iran or permit other countries to use Azerbaijan’s territory for that purpose, reaffirming the content of a March 7 joint statement of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran in Nakhchivan (News.Az, March 13). After that trilateral meeting, the Iranian Ambassador to Baku chastised the media to end their negative coverage of Iran-Azerbaijan relations (APA, March 9).

Iran has other reasons to bully Azerbaijan, which has suffered from Iranian threats since it gained independence from the Soviet Union. In recent months, Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly announced the arrest of Iranian spies, detected Iranian–backed plots to kill prominent Israelis in Azerbaijan and worried about Iranian-backed religious extremists among Azerbaijan’s own predominately Shiite population.

Millions of ethnic Azeris live in Iran and might prefer to join what some Azeri nationalists refer to as “Northern Azerbaijan” rather than remain as Iran’s largest ethnic minority (Trend, February 1). Iran also wants to discourage Azerbaijan from collaborating with the United States and Israel, which receives most of its oil from Azerbaijan, to counter Iran’s regional ambitions (Tehran Jomhuri-ye Eslami, March 3). Claiming that Azerbaijan is colluding with Israel’s Mossad and the CIA to kill Iranian nuclear scientists (Press TV, February 22) is a means to dissuade Azerbaijan from sharing intelligence regarding Iran’s nuclear progress.

Georgia has found itself caught between a desire to maintain tolerably decent ties with Iran while still respecting the strategic interests of the United States, its main foreign protector. Iranian agents are suspected of seeking to kill Israeli diplomats in Georgia, most recently on February 13 when Tbilisi police found a bomb on the car of an Israeli Embassy employee (Today’s Zaman, March 14). Georgia and Iran introduced a visa-free travel regime last year that, while it has boosted the Georgian tourist industry, nevertheless allows Iranian agents to more easily operate in Georgia and its neighbors.

Even Armenia is cross-pressured. Yerevan traditionally maintains close ties with Iran as a means to pressure Azerbaijan. Iran also offers important economic links to Armenia, whose border with Azerbaijan and Turkey remains closed, requiring that all international trade pass through Georgian and Iranian territory. Late last month, the two governments agreed that Iran will export gasoline and oil products to Armenia (Trend, February 28). But Armenia wants to improve ties with the United States and its economic and strategic interests would suffer in an Iranian-US war, which among other problems would disrupt Armenian commercial use of Iranian territory (ArmeniaNow, February 28, 2012).

All three South Caucasus states fear that a war involving Iran would harm their economies by discouraging foreign investors that still recall the Russia-Georgia War of 2008. In addition, a war could lead to massive refugee flights into the South Caucasus, whose countries still shelter many internally displaced people from the 2008 conflict and the earlier Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Tehran lacks a direct deterrent against an Israeli or US attack. Iran could use its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, to retaliate against an Israeli first strike, but Tehran can more easily threaten US regional assets as a means of inducing Washington to continue discouraging an Israeli (or US) attack against Iran. These assets include the Persian Gulf monarchies as well as US facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also US partners in the South Caucasus. Iranian strategists like to keep tensions in the South Caucasus brewing to remind Washington of this asymmetric option as well as to frighten the regional governments into pressuring the United States and Israel to refrain from using force against Iran.

Putin has always excelled in manipulating the symbols of the former regime and playing on the Soviet nostalgia of a large part of the population – here one will recall his declaration according to which the fall of the USSR was the twentieth century’s greatest geopolitical catastrophe (www.kremlin.ru, September 25, 2005). However, the objective of the new Eurasian Union is not to rebuild a unified state. The Kremlin knows all too well that no ruling circle among the post-Soviet states would accept losing the political independence gained in 1991. Further still, neither are the Russian elite interested in any such development. For them, it recalls bad memories of the USSR’s last years when Moscow would complain about paying out of its pocket for the non-viable economies of certain republics, as well as of having to manage local conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Rather, in putting forward this idea, Putin’s aim is to put into place a few joint, supranational mechanisms in specific domains – mainly the economic and financial domains, but also potentially the strategic one – which would guarantee Moscow a right to oversee the evolution of its neighbors. Moscow’s aim is quite obviously to merge the Russia-Belarus Union State, created in 1996 but ailing for some years; the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC – Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan); and the Customs Union of Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan into a single entity. This Union could eventually also be endowed with a strategic section integrating the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The Kremlin’s motivations are multiple. The ruling circles think that the time has come for a new post-Soviet dynamic: since the 2008 economic crisis, Europe has lost influence, a tendency that has been reinforced by the current difficulties with the euro, the question of sovereign debts and Brussels’s crisis of political legitimacy. Russia, on the other hand, presents the image of having a more dynamic economy, even if budgetary difficulties will also soon come into play. Moreover, Putin has never been convinced by the need for Russia to enter the WTO. The Custom Union, and the potential Eurasian Union, is therefore probably a nice way to postpone, once more, Russian accession to the global trade body.

But the stakes are mainly internal to the post-Soviet space, though not all the states of the region are concerned. Kazakhstan remains Moscow’s most faithful ally in terms of economic reintegration, and Putin knows he can count on Nursultan Nazarbayev for such projects, which would not necessarily be the case with a younger successor. Presidential succession, Astana’s most significant future political issue, thus invites Moscow to act in a preemptive fashion. As for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they have indicated that they would like to join the Customs Union despite the problems this will present Bishkek, which is already a member of the WTO (Oxford Analytica, July 28).

With this Eurasian Union, Moscow is also seeking to avoid Alexander Lukashenka making any new attempts at increased autonomy. Minsk’s unprecedented economic difficulties were exacerbated by the EU- and US-imposed sanctions after its repression of the opposition. This has put Belarusian power in a deadlock, leaving it in a head-to-head struggle with its Russian neighbor and largest economic and strategic partner. Last but not least, the time seems ripe to try to force destiny with Ukraine. On many issues Viktor Yanukovich has softened Kiev’s position toward Moscow (e.g., by reinforcing the status of the Russian language, putting limitations on historiographical memory wars, and making its agreement on the Sevastopol base). However, Moscow is annoyed by the Timoshenko affair and Ukraine’s continued dialogue with NATO and the EU, and above all, wants Kiev to join the Customs Union.

The Eurasian Union thus targets a Eurasian core including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and possibly also Armenia, which is already a member of the CSTO. Above all, however, what Moscow dreams of is the key missing piece in its reconstitution of a post-Soviet puzzle, Ukraine. But by no means does Russia imagine a return to forceful integration: reticent countries will not be forced, but simply bypassed and marginalized.

The announcement gave rise to significant activity among the most diverse ideologues of Russian nationalism. Alexander Dugin, the eulogist of neo-Eurasianism and president of the small International Eurasian Movement, rejoiced at this declaration, and suddenly seems once again to be riding high after having spent many years in the wilderness. In fact, some rumors on the Russian internet suggested that the Secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union, Pavel Borodin, might soon be replaced by Alexander Dugin, Borodin’s close friend, who has regularly visited Minsk to be at Lukashenka’s side (www.rus-obr.ru, September 10). But the Presidential Administration will more probably choose the presidential envoy in the Volga Federal District, the former secretary of EurAsEC, Grigoriy Rapota.

Is Putin inspired, then, by Eurasianist ideology? He never overtly makes reference to it, nor does he insist, in his last declaration, on the unity of civilization of post-Soviet peoples. His narrative is in fact centered, not on the need for a unity of culture between Eurasian peoples, but on that of Russia to arm itself better against globalization. To become one of the leaders of a new globalized world, Russia needs both a partnership with Europe, and a right of supervision over some of the ‘Eurasian,’ i.e. post-Soviet countries. Nor does he present this potential Eurasian Union as having an overtly anti-American or anti-European agenda. However, if Eurasianism is defined as a vision of Russia’s great power aspirations backed by the rest of the post-Soviet space (or at the very least by some of the post-Soviet countries), then Putin’s declaration is part of a kind of “soft” Eurasianism. Putin’s previous declaration during the re-opening of the Russian Geographical Society, “When we say great, a great country, a great state – certainly, size matters. (…) When there is no size, there is no influence, no meaning,” is a Eurasianist declaration of intent on the role of geography in building a Russian destiny (www.sptimes.ru, November 20, 2009). But the Eurasian Union could also turn out to be a simple PR action addressed to the Russian electorate, since, while there may be no doubt about Putin’s re-election, there does exist a question about his regime’s declining popular legitimacy.

U.S. diplomatic dispatches published by the transparency group WikiLeaks show repeated efforts in recent years by U.S. diplomats to convince the Chinese government to move more decisively to stop the export to the nuclear-armed South Asian state of equipment capable of being used in the development of ballistic missiles.

A January 2007 cable discusses the planned sale by the Chinese company Jinan Metal Forming Machinery Engineering Co. to export ring-rolling equipment to Pakistan’s ballistic missile development program. While the ring-rolling machine was not covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, its use by Pakistan was in question, as it could be utilized to produce “stiffener rings for ballistic missile airframes and in the production of solid rocket motor cases,” the cable states.

A September 2007 cable details how the United States was able to learn a guarantee of financing had been issued to Jinan Metal Forming to aid the sale of machinery to Pakistan’s National Development Complex, which is responsible for work on the Shaheen class of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Another Chinese company in February 2009 marketed to Pakistan’s Aginel Enterprises the sale of 2,200 pounds of specialty steel that has been utilized in “components of Pakistan’s Ghaznavi short-range ballistic missile,” the U.S. State Department said.

U.S. officials in July 2009 questioned the Russian government about a planned sale by the Russian company Optolink to the Chinese firm, Beijing Comfort Technology and Development Co., of “three-axis rotation and single-axis gyroscopes.” The United States believed the Chinese firm was a shell company whose purpose was to procure equipment for Pakistan’s cruise missile program.

In a July 2009 dispatch, U.S. envoys informed Beijing that another Chinese company, Beijing Jingda Zhiyuan Technologies Development, was attempting to export to a Pakistani missile entity carbon fiber covered by the Nuclear Suppliers Groups and the Missile Technology Control Regime (Pranab Dhal Samanta, Indian Express, Sept. 12).

A series of moves by China indicate that it is exploring new options in its relationship with India, including a policy of engagement.

By Rupakjyoti Borah for ISN Insights

The June visit of an eight-member Indian military delegation to China for defense talks marked a welcome resumption of contact between the two countries after a nearly year-long hiatus. Regular defense exchanges between the two Asian giants had been suspended since July 2010, when China refused a visa to Lieutenant-General BS Jaswal, then-head of the Indian Army’s Northern Command, because he was in charge of what the Chinese termed the ‘sensitive region’ of Kashmir, compounding already existing tensions. For years, China has been issuing ‘stapled visas’ to the people of the Indian provinces of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir as opposed to regular visas for people from other parts of India.

Toward a Chinese policy of engagement?

In another important development, representatives of China’s Foreign Policy Advisory Group (FPAG) recently indicated the country will look to recalibrate ties with India and strive to balance its relations with India and Pakistan during the next Five-Year Plan period (2011-15). The FPAG was also in favor of an early settlement to the festering border dispute with India. While this may not indicate a complete reversal of China’s attitude towards India, it does suggest that China is exploring new options, including a policy of engagement.

There are many reasons for it to do so.

First, as the United States and NATO prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, China wants to fill the inevitable power vacuum in the region. Without India’s benign acquiescence, this will not be possible and Beijing knows it.

Second, at a recent summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, India kicked off its quest for full-membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO. The firm backing for India’s membership by countries like Russia and Kazakhstan shows how difficult it will be for China to diplomatically sideline India.

Third, India’s improving defense ties with the US has China worried that it might be pushing India closer to the US in general. India decided to purchase 10 C-17 Globemaster III heavy-lift transport aircraft from the US in recent months under the Foreign Military Sales route (government-to-government) in a deal worth approximately $4.1 billion. The India-US civilian nuclear deal in 2008 already had the Chinese worried, and US President Barack Obama pledged US support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during his country visit in November 2010.

However, many areas of friction remain between China and India. China’s decision to dam the river Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) has raised concerns inside India. China has never openly backed India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Many Indian observers also point out that China has adopted a so-called “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India by building naval bases in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Building on a firm foundation

It is worth noting, however, that disagreements in these areas have not precluded the two countries from cooperating in others. Economic relations between the two countries have neared a high point and continue to improve. While most of the world’s major economic powers have been weakened by the ‘Great Recession,’ China and India have bucked the trend. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, the two countries agreed to a $100 billion target in bilateral trade by 2015. China and India have already concluded several high profile joint ventures and many more are in the works – in areas such as power generation, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, IT and telecommunications.

For example, one of India’s biggest IT companies, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), has a joint venture with China’s Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) to provide IT services to China’s huge domestic market, as well as the US, Europe and the rest of Asia, while India’s leading automotive forgings maker Bharat Forge has a joint venture with one of China’s biggest auto makers, FAW Corporation.

The increasing cooperation between the two neighbors was perhaps most visible during the December 2009 Climate Change summit in Copenhagen.Sporting what has been dubbed the “Copenhagen spirit,” the two countries decided to set up a Beijing-New Delhi hotline last year.

India and China also share an interest in fighting Islamist terrorism in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Though China has close ties with Pakistan, it also worries about links between separatists in its restive Xinjiang province and Islamist militants based in Pakistan.

The two Asian giants have also been cooperating in the energy sector. In 2006, the Gas Authority of India Limited signed MoUs with the China Petrochemical Corporation and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, laying the groundwork for cooperation between India and China in energy exploration both within the two countries and across the globe. Joint military exercises have also been conducted on a regular basis.

China and India have decided to cooperate in some areas while agreeing to disagree in others. One expects both countries to continue testing the chinks in each others’ armor.

Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai and Zaheer Ahmad, the two U.S. heads of the Kashmiri American Council, were charged with secretly working for Pakistan’s intelligence services by the District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia on July 18, following a six-year investigation by the FBI. Sarah Linden, the FBI agent who supervised the investigation, also asserted in an affidavit submitted to the court the same day that two European NGOs, the London-based Justice Foundation, which is headed by Nazir Ahmad Shawl, and the Kashmir Centre in Brussels, headed by Abdul Majid Tramboo, had similar links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. All three organisations defend the rights of people in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and regularly denounce the Indian Army’s ill-treatment of the civilian population in the area.

Linden said in her statement that the head of the Kashmiri American Council reported to the representative of the Inter-Services Intelligence at the Pakistan embassy in Washington. They also allegedly received funds from Islamabad via false U.S. donors. Their unofficial mission was to influence U.S. decision-makers on the issue of Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir.

It was not until The Washington Times’ Eli Lake broke the story in a three-part investigative report (July 22, 27, 29) that Obama administration officials publicly acknowledged the September 22, 2010 bomb incident at its Tbilisi embassy. The officials, however, spoke anonymously and in the wider context of addressing multiple challenges to the Russia-reset policy.

On July 28, the US National Intelligence Council (analytical arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) provided the Intelligence Committees of both chambers of Congress with a second analysis, following up to the December 2010 analysis of the September 2010 incident. Both analyses drew on a variety of inputs, including those from Georgian counterintelligence. The basic conclusion is that Russian GRU’s Major Yevgeny Borisov, stationed on a military base in Abkhazia, coordinated the planting of about a dozen low-yield bombs in Georgia during 2010, including that outside the US embassy (another bomb outside the embassy was detected and defused).

Borisov operated from Abkhazia through a few agents recruited inside Georgia, at least one of whom is in pre-trial detention since December in Tbilisi. Several of the bombs, including those at the US embassy, were made to look innocuous by using candy-box packaging.

A blunder helped to confirm Borisov’s already suspected role. On his behalf, his deputy telephoned the European Union’s Monitoring Mission (EUMM, in Georgia’s interior, with a hotline to the Russian military), offering to help with the casualties of a bomb explosion that had supposedly occurred on the railway bridge near Poti, Georgia’s Black Sea commercial port. However, the field agent had falsely reported to Borisov by mobile telephone minutes earlier that the bomb had exploded. In fact, Georgian counterintelligence was tracking that agent and defused the bomb.

The Georgians intercepted at least two telephone calls from field agents inside Georgia to Borisov’s office, immediately following explosions. Georgian authorities put six suspects on trial in December 2010. Borisov and his deputy, GRU officer Mukhran Tskhadaia, were sentenced in absentia to long prison terms. The investigation established that Borisov’s office supplied the explosive material (Hexogen, known as Cyclonit or RDX in the West) and paid those agents.

Following the US intelligence community’s December 2010 analysis, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised this issue with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, in February and July 2011, on the sidelines of signing the START agreement and a child adoption agreement, respectively. The US administration failed to inform the public about the incident at its Tbilisi embassy. It disclosed Clinton’s approach to Lavrov only after the story had surfaced in Washington. When this occurred, the Russian side has not denied the incident. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and State Secretary, Grigory Karasin, told Russian media: “We have conducted a professional investigation. Considering the sensitivity of the matter, both the American and the Georgian sides have been informed of the results” (Interfax, July 28). This sounds as a semi-admission of Russian responsibility for the incident.

Obama administration officials, speaking to the press without nominal attribution, downplay the incident in two ways. First, there is no full inter-agency consensus about a direct responsibility of the GRU at the high levels of that organization. Perhaps Borisov was operating as a rogue agent, these officials speculate aloud. Second, the incident at the US embassy in Tbilisi has more to do with Russia-Georgia than with Russia-US relations; and “it pokes the Georgians in the eye, not the US” (EurasiaNet, The Cable, The New York Times, Washington Times, July 27, 28, 29).

The first argument recalls the hesitant responses to Russian military moves during the 1990s in the “frozen conflicts.” At that time, US officials tended to ascribe such moves to “rogue” or “free-lancing” Russian generals in the field, so as to exonerate Moscow and protect the White House’s efforts to build special relations with the Kremlin leader. That thesis lacked credibility even during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, let alone Vladimir Putin’s. The second argument, implying that the blast at the US embassy in Tbilisi is mainly a Russia-Georgia matter, rather than Russia-US matter, is a thesis that rewards Moscow’s attempts to separate the United States and Georgia from each other. Moscow is regularly testing Washington’s capacity to stand up for US allies. Such tests can take overt and brutal forms, or (as in this case) a carefully calibrated form in Moscow’s practice.

On June 17, France’s Caisse des Depots et Consignations group and the North Caucasus Resorts corporation signed a preliminary agreement on cooperation in developing North Caucasus ski resorts. According to RIA Novosti, French investments in North Caucasus development might amount up to $1.7 billion. An estimated 20 to 30 French companies are expected to provide equipment and possibly “know-how” to building ski resort areas in select areas of the mountainous North Caucasus. But it will reportedly take an additional 5-6 months to see the details of emerging Franco-Russian cooperation (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, June 19).

The business agreements signed by the North Caucasian republics appeared modest, with only Dagestan signing an agreement with a foreign company. Finland’s Arvotec will build a fishing farm in Kizlyar, in northern Dagestan. Dagestan will also receive a solar energy plant, built by the Russian company Hevel LLC and powered by the Swiss high-tech corporation Oerlikon. Russia’s Renova Group has a 42 percent stake in Oerlikon and 51 percent of Hevel LLC, while the remaining 49 percent of Hevel LLC belongs to the Russian state corporation Rosnano. The Chechen capital Grozny will receive an investment from the Russian state bank Vnesheconombank to upgrade the city’s infrastructure (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, www.renova.ru, June 19).

The striking detail about the discussion on North Caucasus economic development is the fact that real investment in the region is still being discussed. The grand vision for developing “the North Caucasian tourism cluster” was unveiled by Khloponin one year ago and the actual investment and implementation of the project is still in its very early stages. Khloponin stated at the forum that the North Caucasian Resorts Corporation would receive additional government funds, raising its capitalization to $2 billion. This particular promise was made several times over the past year. Khloponin outlined the government’s plans for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus, which includes the development of tourism, the construction industry and the agricultural sector, and the extraction of natural resources. Aside from that, Moscow’s envoy emphasized the urgent need for unemployed North Caucasian youth to migrate to inner Russian regions because of the lack of employment opportunities in the North Caucasus (http://www.forumspb.com/en/SPIEF_2011/Programme_2011/programm_4#).

The idea of “dissolving” the peoples of the North Caucasus in greater Russia seems to remain an idee fixe for the Russian government.  Apart from organizing a massive exodus from the North Caucasus, the government is preoccupied with bolstering the region’s ethnic Russian population. On June 15, Khloponin proposed distributing arable lands in the North Caucasian republics that are still directly owned by Moscow among the Cossacks. The proposal, if implemented, is expected to spark another round of conflicts in the North Caucasus, which suffers from a lack of arable lands. Some observers have already made parallels to the Russian policies in the Tsarist period, when North Caucasians were arbitrarily moved from one place to another and their best lands were distributed among the Cossacks and ethnic Russian settlers (http://mn.ru/blog_caucasus/20110616/302555518.html).

There were also some novelties at the special session on the North Caucasus at the St. Petersburg forum. Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov brushed aside widespread suspicions inside the Russian government that hostile foreign influences are the primary cause of violence in the North Caucasus. Ivanov also stated that suspicions in the West that Moscow is deliberately aggravating the situation in the region were unfounded. According to Ivanov, the vicious cycle of economic underdevelopment, unemployment and violence, on the one hand, and a lack of investment, on the other, make the North Caucasus problem particularly hard to tackle (http://www.forumspb.com/en/SPIEF_2011/Programme_2011/programm_4#).

Russian politicians and analysts habitually refer to the violence in the North Caucasus as an “inexplicable phenomenon.” While there may be a degree of irrationality and inexplicability in any conflict, including bloodshed in the North Caucasus, the violence in the region is easily explained by very simple practical things, like the lack of popular participation in politics, the artificially imposed isolation of the region from the outside world and the government’s crackdown on political dissent.

Igor Yurgens, the liberal economist and one of the closest economic advisors of President Dmitry Medvedev, raised a provocative issue at the forum, asking the panelists about the possibility of the Russian government replicating the Soviet experience of an “affirmative action” for North Caucasians. Yurgens proposed promoting North Caucasians to high positions in the Russian government, the same way that the Soviet government promoted USSR minorities to the Politburo (http://www.forumspb.com/en/SPIEF_2011/Programme_2011/programm_4#). Such cooptation would probably well serve Moscow, as a way of showing the North Caucasian elites that they are integrated into the country’s leadership and have a stake in keeping it going. There are, however, serious doubts about its feasibility. Russian nationalism is on rise, and with last year’s riot at Moscow’s Manezhka Square and other outbursts of Russian nationalism, the Russian government is unlikely to take the risk of carrying out affirmative action on behalf of North Caucasians.

Wolfgang Schuessel, the former federal chancellor of Austria, made important comments highlighting the weak spots in Moscow’s evolving project to develop tourism in the North Caucasus. He warned that developing tourism is a long-term objective that requires today’s generation to work for the benefit of future generations. Moscow expects much quicker returns – within 10 years at the most, according to official estimates. Schuessel urged the Russian government to integrate the local population into the project from the very beginning, avoiding a top-down approach. Schuessel said that in Austria, projects in which municipalities were given 10-15 percent stakes in tourism projects worked better than projects in which such stakes were not distributed (http://www.forumspb.com/en/SPIEF_2011/Programme_2011/programm_4#).

The Russian government’s approach to developing tourism in the North Caucasus is manifestly top-down. Its approach to tourism development is to put the local economies and elites under tighter control from Moscow, so the North Caucasian republics and municipalities are highly unlikely to receive stakes or a sense of being integrated in the project to build ski resorts. Moscow’s tourism development project yet again displays the contradictions between the real economic needs of the North Caucasus and the stagnating political evolution that hampers regional economic development.

Currently, Indian policies do not permit production of missiles with ranges in excess of 3,100 miles. Only China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States today possess an ICBM strike capability.

The Indian Defense Research and Development Organization in May forwarded the ICBM proposal to the Defense Ministry, which is now weighing the matter. A final decision on the plan is expected to be made by the government’s Cabinet Security Committee.

New Delhi adopted its voluntary missile-range restriction after it achieved a successful trial launch of its Agni 3 missile in 2006. The intermediate-range weapon can travel about 1,860 miles. That flight permitted DRDO researchers to advance development of intercontinental strike capacities, though the civilian leadership still needs to approve the new capabilities.

The Indian military has announced plans to conduct a first flight test of the Agni 5 missile in December. The long-range missile is designed to travel as far as 3,100 miles, which is almost enough to classify it as an ICBM (see GSN, June 6).

Informed insiders said the chief aim of developing an ICBM would be to prevent an attack by neighboring China, which has significantly increased its own military spending in recent years (Rahul Datta, Pioneer, June 20).

Given that the German non-paper proposes an agenda for negotiations, this document’s gaps are at least as relevant as its proposals. Thus, Berlin’s document eliminates the following critical issues, or goals, from the current agenda: 1. withdrawal of Russian troops and the transformation/internationalization of that “peacekeeping” operation; 2. support for democratic reforms and demilitarization in Transnistria, during and as part of the conflict-resolution process; 3. codifying a special status (autonomy) for Transnistria within the framework of Moldova’s constitution; 4. holding out a European integration perspective for Moldova, which would stimulate Transnistria’s population to support the country’s reunification. While Chisinau proceeds from these objectives in the negotiating process, Berlin omits them, in apparent deference to Moscow.

Those four goals are fundamental to Chisinau’s negotiating position, as reaffirmed in its non-paper on the upcoming negotiations (Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Basic approaches to the Transnistria conflict-settlement process,” May 2011). Moldovan governments irrespective of party affiliations have pursued those objectives ever since the country adopted its European orientation (from 2004 onward). Indeed, Chisinau designed that negotiating position to support its European course, instead of going for a deal on Russia’s terms.

If negotiations restart from premises jointly defined by Moscow and Berlin, these four critical gaps in Berlin’s position could lead to:  1. a settlement negotiated in the presence of Russian troops, distorting any political outcome; 2. agreements that legitimize a Kremlin-installed leadership in Tiraspol; 3. a “joint,” Chisinau-Tiraspol re-write of Moldova’s constitution, as some German diplomats actually suggest; 4. diminished appeal and low credibility of the EU in Transnistria and ultimately even in Moldova.

In conversations accompanying Berlin’s non-paper, German diplomats propose turning Moldova from a “unitary” state into a “federation.” The non-paper hints at this by “exclud[ing] a confederation,” thus allowing sufficient room for Moscow and Tiraspol to seek Moldova’s “federalization.” German diplomacy favors this on two counts: as an outright concession to Russia, and a pretense that federalism can work in Moldova/Transnistria more or less as it has in Germany.

One far-reaching document, leaked in full to the Chisinau press, seems to show the tip of an iceberg. Ambassador Patricia Flor, head of the German Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Europe-South Caucasus-Central Asia division, is handling the Transnistria conflict negotiations for that ministry. She urges Chisinau to “get rid of its federalization-phobia,” imputing this to Moldovan politicians’ poor knowledge of successful federations in Europe. Ambassador Flor proposes creating a Chisinau-Tiraspol working group to draft a new, “federal” constitution for Moldova; and offers German assistance to that end, drawing on Germany’s successful model of federalism (Flux [Chisinau], April 22, May 2, 15; Jurnal de Chisinau, May 17).

Inviting Transnistria’s current administration, with its security apparatus and Russian troops in place, to re-negotiate Moldova’s constitution in accordance with Tiraspol’s wishes, would be a far cry from German federalism. It would derail Moldova from its European course, debilitate its politics, and potentially create a Russian-controlled statelet within a dysfunctional Moldovan state.

This proposal would turn the clock back by almost a decade. It rehashes Russia’s attempts in 2002-2003 to “federalize” Moldova with Transnistria, starting from a “joint” Chisinau-Tiraspol rewrite of Moldova’s constitution. Some US field-level diplomats had joined forces with Russia on this issue, treating Moldova as a currency of exchange at that time. Washington, however, reversed this move as Chisinau turned West. To shield the state from such pressures in the future, and protect its Western orientation, Moldova adopted the 2005 law on the principles for settling the Transnistria conflict (EDM, June 6).

Regardless of Berlin’s motives or missteps, the Moldovan government has welcomed Germany’s active role on the Transnistria issue in recent months. Chisinau believes that Germany’s entry into this process can generate a positive dynamic, at least for re-starting the 5+2 negotiations. Moldovan Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, has held several productive meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and elsewhere. Filat, his government, and the parliament, however, can hardly accept Russian or German proposals that would turn the clock back on Moldova. The existing constitutional setup, and unitary character of the state, can accommodate a special status for Transnistria, according to Filat returning from his latest German visit (Moldpres, May 20).

Saakashvili said the two people killed had been run over by a motorcade belonging to one of the opposition leaders and accused those who rose against him of working on behalf of the “occupation” forces of the Kremlin. “These provocations are being prepared from outside the country,” Saakashvili told the nation in a television appearance. “We will be vigilant and we will always respond adequately to any provocation from our enemy and occupier,” he said. Russia seized two Georgian republics at the end of a five-day war in August 2008 and continues to impose an economic blockade on its tiny Caucasus neighbour — a country with few resources or other natural trading partners. But Saakashvili has used the time since the war to reaffirm his alliance with the United States and still enjoys broad public supported that has left opposition leaders splintered and fighting among themselves. The government — sensitive to the condemnation that began trickling in from Europe on Thursday — released an audiotape it said showed rally leader Nino Burjanadze plotting a civil war. The tape began with a man identified as Burjanadze’s son Anzor telling his mother that “if you assume responsibility, it would even be worthwile to launch a civil war” in which up to 500 people died. The woman is then heard replying: “Yes, you are right.” The opposition leader told AFP that the voice on the tape was hers but “taken out of context”. “We did not do anything to hurt the country,” Burjanadze said. Russia immediately rose to the opposition leader’s defence and said “it was becoming increasingly apparent that the regime’s claims cannot be trusted. “These events must be seriously investigated at the international level,” said Russian foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich. And the European Commission called Saakashvili’s decision to use force against street protests for the second time in four years “very regrettable”. “We understand a need to maintain law and order, but as we have already told the Georgian government we consider that needs to be done in a proportionate way,” Commission spokeswoman Natasha Butler said in Brussels. Baton-wielding riot police also used tear gas to disperse a similar but larger series of rallies in November 2007 that Saakashvili had also linked to Russia at the time. Yet the US ambassador appeared more sympathetic of Saakashvili’s position in a statement issued after the unrest. “It is also important to remember that there were clearly a number of people included in that protest who were not interested in peacefully protesting, but were looking to spark a violent confrontation,” US ambassador John Bass said. “The government took an important step in offering protesters an alternative place to protest today that would have allowed this parade to go forward.” Some analysts interpreted the US embassy’s comments as a sign of unflinching support for Saakashvili from Washington. “Georgia’s partners will only reinforce their support for Saakashvili since they can see how many threats Georgia and its leader still face,” said Alex Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

One document (link.reuters.com/tyn29r), given to The New York Times, say detainees who associated with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate “may have provided support to al-Qaida or the Taliban, or engaged in hostilities against US or Coalition forces”.

The ISI, along with al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence, are among 32 groups on the list of “associated forces”, which also includes Egypt’s Islamic Jihad, headed by al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The document defines an “associate force” as “militant forces and organizations with which al-Qaida, the al-Qaida network, or the Taliban has an established working, supportive, or beneficiary relationship for the achievement of common goals.”

The ISI said it had no comment.

The “JTF-GTMO Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants” likely dates from 2007 according to its classification code, and is part of a trove of 759 files on detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. military prison in Cuba.

The secret documents were obtained by WikiLeaks and date from between 2002 and 2009, but they were made available to The New York Times from a separate source, the paper said.

They reveal that most of the 172 remaining prisoners have been rated as a “high risk” of posing a threat to the United States and its allies if released without adequate rehabilitation and supervision, the newspaper said.

The documents also show about a third of the 600 detainees already sent to other countries were also designated “high risk” before they were freed or passed to the custody of other governments, the Times said in its report late on Sunday.

SEAT-OF-THE-PANTS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

The dossiers, prepared under the Bush administration, also show the seat-of-the-pants intelligence gathering in war zones that led to the incarcerations of innocent men for years in cases of mistaken identity or simple misfortune, the Times said.

The documents are largely silent about the use of the harsh interrogation tactics at Guantanamo that drew global condemnation, the newspaper reported.

The Times also said an Obama administration task force set up in January 2009 had reviewed the assessments and, in some cases, come to different conclusions. “Thus… the documents published by The Times may not represent the government’s current views of detainees at Guantanamo.”

WikiLeaks previously released classified Pentagon reports on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and 250,000 State Department cables. Bradley Manning, a 23-year-old U.S. soldier accused of leaking secret documents to WikiLeaks has been detained since May of last year.

Last week, the Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Pakistani media that the ISI had a “longstanding” relationship with the Haqqani Network which is allied to al Qaeda.

“Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn’t happen,” Mullen told Pakistan’s daily Dawn newspaper.

“So that’s at the core — it’s not the only thing — but that’s at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship,” Mullen said.

Pakistan’s powerful ISI has long been suspected of maintaining ties to the Haqqani network, cultivated during the 1980s when Jalaluddin Haqqani was a feared battlefield commander against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

U.S.-Pakistan ties have been strained this year by the case of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, who shot dead two Pakistanis in Lahore on January 27, as well as by tensions in Pakistan over U.S. drone strikes that have fanned anti-American sentiment.

Georgian Parliament unanimously endorsed on April 19 government’s proposal to annul a five-year agreement with Russia setting out procedures for transit of Russian military personnel and cargo to Armenia via Georgia.

The agreement on transit of military personnel and cargo, giving Russia access to its 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia through land and air via Georgia, was signed in March, 2006 in parallel with a separate agreement based on which Russia pulled out its military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The both of the agreements were ratified by the Georgian Parliament on April 13, 2006.

“After Russia’s aggression against Georgia, naturally, it was deemed appropriate by the competent agencies to annul the agreement following expiration of its five-year term,” Nino Kalandadze, the Georgian deputy foreign minister, told lawmakers on April 19.

She said that last time when Georgia issued permission to Russia’s request for military transit based on the agreement was in July, 2008. After the August, 2008 war Georgia received one such request from Russia, but Tbilisi turned it down, Kalandadze said.

“Since then the Russian Federation has not applied for transit permission,” she added.

“I think annulment of this agreement does not really require additional explanations, because this agreement is in contravention of our national interests,” said Irakli Kavtaradze, a lawmaker from the ruling party, who is a deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs.

A day before the parliamentary vote on the issue, Georgian Defense Minister, Bacho Akhalaia, paid his first official visit to Armenia on April 18.

In Yerevan he met with his Armenian counterpart Seyran Ohanyan and President Serzh Sargsyan.

Speaking at a joint news conference with his Armenian counterpart, the Georgian Defense Minister said that relations between the two countries were of special importance and there was nothing that could derail those close ties.

According to the Georgian Defense Ministry the main topics of discussions during the visit were exchange of experience in defense sphere and cooperation in military education. According to MoD, the Georgian side offered Armenian counterparts to train their soldiers at the Georgian army mountain training site in Sachkhere.